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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
How the local environment where Italian firms operate affects their economic performance 
and behavior has been the object of great scrutiny. Research has focused on issues such as local 
institutional quality (Lasagni, Nifo, & Vecchione, 2015), financial development (Moretti, 2014), the 
presence of innovative milieux (Belussi, Sammarra, & Sedita, 2010), or industrial agglomeration 
(Cainelli, Ganau, & Iacobucci, 2016), among others. Most of this literature tends to point towards 
the idea that, as firms interact with local actors (e.g. neighboring firms, banks, local institutions, 
research centers), their capacity to get and assimilate knowledge, their competitiveness, and their 
economic performance are positively or negatively affected by the socio-economic context in which 
they are located. Firms operating in different environments are likely to gain from both tangible 
(e.g. local availability of inputs and intermediate goods, reduction of transportation costs) and 
intangible (e.g. the reduction of transaction costs favored by repeated interactions and increasing 
trust among local actors) agglomeration externalities that reduce the costs of the economic activity, 
thus fostering their efficiency and growth (Baldwin, Brown, & Rigby, 2010; Martin, Mayer, & 
Mayneris, 2011). 
 
This paper builds on this idea and, while providing additional insights on the role played by 
the context where a firm operates on its performance – defined in terms of Total Factor Productivity 
(TFP) growth –, it particularly focuses on what is widely regarded as an important negative 
externality: organized crime in Italy. 
 
Organized crime (namely, mafia-type criminality) represents an Italian symbol. Italy is often 
identified as a country with pervasive organized crime. From its places of origin – Sicily, 
Campania, Calabria, and Apulia – mafia-type activities have spread to many other parts of the 
country (Buonanno and Pazzona, 2014). A widespread presence of criminality is likely to affect the 
economic activity and therefore the performance of individual firms. Criminal organizations reduce 
the level of legality and security of the places where they operate (La Spina and Lo Forte, 2006), 
undermining both the socio-economic environment and the local firms' performance. Organized 
crime makes the business environment less secure and dynamic and increases uncertainty, reducing 
trust and reciprocity among agents. Criminal organizations function in the market through 
controlled "illicit" firms, altering competition and market rules. It can be said that organized crime 
acts as a tax on the local economic system (Detotto and Otranto, 2010): it increases the costs and 
reduces the returns of economic activity, undermining firms' efficiency (Albanese and Marinelli, 
2013). Yet, despite its expansion beyond its place of origin, the presence of organized crime across 
Italy remains extremely uneven. Areas of the country completely ravaged by crime coexist, often in 
close proximity, with regions where organized criminality is almost absent. 
 
This paper empirically investigates the extent to which a firm's productivity benefits in terms 
of agglomeration and industrial clustering are erased by the presence of organized crime in the 
firm's region. The hypothesis driving the research is that organized crime will dent a firm's growth 
potential by reducing trust and reciprocity in the local system and weakening the traditional market-
based linkages among firms, increasing transaction costs and diluting any positive externalities 
arising from location in highly agglomerated areas. 
 
The empirical analysis covers a large sample of Italian manufacturing small- and medium- 
sized firms (SME) over the period 2010-2013. The identification strategy is based on a sample-
selection model which allows accounting for firm exit over the three-year growth period considered, 
and the robustness of the results is tested controlling for the potential endogeneity of the variables 
capturing organized crime and industrial clustering, as well as by estimating the firm's TFP through 
three different approaches. Overall, empirical results support the theoretical hypotheses: while 
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agglomeration and clustering foster firms' productivity growth, organized crime has a direct 
negative effect on it as well as a harmful indirect impact, offsetting any benefits of agglomeration. 
 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the literature on organized 
crime and agglomeration and the theoretical predictions derived from it. Section 3 describes the 
data and introduces the econometric methodology. Section 4 discusses the empirical results. Section 
5 concludes. 
 
2. CLUSTERING, ORGANIZED CRIME AND PRODUCTIVITY 
 
2.1. Industrial clustering and productivity 
 
Agglomeration and industrial clustering are generally regarded as beneficial for the 
development and growth of firms. From the pioneering work of Marshall (1890), it has been often 
posited that firms operating in spatially-bounded, high-density areas may benefit from tangible and 
intangible externalities which spread across local actors, favoring the economic performance of 
both the local system and the individual agents within it (Glaeser, Kallal, Scheinkman, & Shleifer, 
1992; Puga, 2010; Rosenthal and Strange, 2004). 
 
Benefits of agglomeration are realized through two fundamental types of externalities: 
localization and diversification economies. Localization economies date back to Marshall (1890) 
and refer to the spatial concentration of firms operating in the same industry (Glaeser et al., 1992). 
The presence of firms sharing a common competence base facilitates intra-industry transmission of 
knowledge and technological spillovers (Nooteboom, 2000), as well as benefits from reduced 
transport costs, external-scale economies, and the availability of specialized workers and suppliers 
(Duranton and Puga, 2004; Martin et al., 2011). Diversification economies arise from the 
geographic concentration of firms operating in different industries (Jacobs, 1969). They favor the 
cross-fertilization of existing ideas and technologies in a diversified local economic environment as 
well as tangible positive externalities related to the availability of specialized business services 
providers and the presence of intermediate goods' suppliers operating at different stages of the 
production chain (Cainelli et al., 2016; Caragliu et al., 2016). 
 
There is no shortage of cross-country literature on the agglomeration-productivity relationship 
at the firm level (e.g. Cainelli and Lupi, 2010; Cainelli et al., 2016; Cingano and Schivardi, 2004; 
Ganau, 2016; Henderson, 2003; Lee, Jang, & Hong, 2010; Martin et al., 2011). This literature 
distinguishes between static (short-run) and dynamic (long-run) effects of localization and 
diversification economies. The static component of the agglomeration phenomenon concerns 
tangible and intangible externalities arising from market-based relationships (e.g. availability of 
specialized inputs' suppliers, reduced transport and transaction costs). The dynamic component 
involves intangible externalities derived from knowledge and information flows and technological 
spillovers (Ganau, 2016; Martin et al., 2011). 
 
In this paper we explicitly consider tangible and intangible market-based externalities, by 
building on the distinction between localization and diversification economies. We synthesize intra- 
and inter-industry market-based externalities by means of a concept of industrial clustering which 
refers to the geographic concentration of horizontally and vertically market-related firms. Akin to 
Porter's (1990) notion of cluster, the concept of industrial clustering captures the spatial 
agglomeration of firms operating at different stages of the production chain, allowing to 
simultaneously account for static localization- and diversification-type externalities. Industrial 
clustering thus encompasses tangible – related to the availability of intra- and inter-industry inputs' 
suppliers, as well as to the reduction of transport costs (Cainelli et al., 2016) – and intangible effects 
– related to the reduction of transaction costs, resulting from face-to-face interactions, repeated and 
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long-lasting market relationships, and increasing trust among business partners (Cainelli, 2008; 
Mistri and Solari, 2003). The combination of tangible and intangible effects will spur firm-level 
growth by reducing the costs of the economic activity, either through lowering the costs of local 
inputs and intermediate goods or through reduced transaction costs resulting from long-lasting 
production linkages among local firms. Therefore, existing literature tends to underline that the 
geographic concentration of (intra- and inter-industry) market-related firms is expected to raise 
firm-level productivity. 
 
2.2. Organized crime and productivity 
 
The effect of organized crime on productivity has featured in economic literature since, at 
least, the work of Schelling (1971). Organized crime is widely regarded to have both direct and 
indirect negative effects on the economic activity. First, the presence of criminal organizations 
weakens legality and security (Daniele and Marani, 2011; La Spina and Lo Forte, 2006). Such a 
situation makes the business environment less secure and dynamic, increases uncertainty and the 
risks associated with new investment opportunities, and reduces trust and reciprocity among 
economic agents. In these circumstances the formation and development of economic networks is 
jeopardized, as firms are less willing to establish solid and long-lasting production linkages. 
Second, organized crime increases the costs and reduces the returns of the economic activity 
(Buonanno, Montolio, & Vanin, 2009; Powell, Manish, & Nair, 2010; Huggins and Thompson, 
2016), acting like a tax on the economic system (Detotto and Otranto, 2010). Organized crime 
influences the allocation of public resources, alters market rules, and reduces competition among 
firms, e.g. in terms of inputs' procurement, distribution channels, as well as public contracts (Felli 
and Tria, 2000; Netti, 1999). Finally, firms may be also coerced by criminal organizations, for 
instance, into acquiring inputs from suppliers controlled by the criminal organization (Albanese and 
Marinelli, 2013) or into directly paying the organization itself in order to be able to operate and stay 
in market. Overall, these conditions damage economic performance and are translated into reduced 
investments, higher costs, and lower efficiency (Daniele, 2009; Detotto and Otranto, 2010). 
 
Only a limited number of contributions have empirically analyzed the economic effects of 
organized crime. Some works have focused on its macroeconomic implications in terms of labor 
productivity (e.g. Centorrino and Ofria, 2008; Felli and Tria, 2000), GDP growth (e.g. Pinotti, 
2015; Tullio and Quarella, 1999), employment rates (e.g. Peri, 2004), inward foreign direct 
investments (e.g. Daniele and Marani, 2011), and public transfers (Barone and Narciso, 2015). The 
microeconomic effects of organized crime and, specifically, the effects on an average firm 
economic activity have, by contrast, drawn much less attention. Among these limited contributions, 
Albanese and Marinelli (2013), Ofria (2000) and Netti (1999) can be highlighted. Albanese and 
Marinelli (2013) explicitly focus on the effect of organized crime on the productivity of Italian 
firms. They find that organized crime reduces firm-level productivity regardless of firm size and 
sector. This negative effect is robust to the potential endogeneity of the organized crime variable, 
even though their instrumental-variable (IV) estimations refer only to a sub-sample of firms from 
selected Southern regions, i.e. those historically affected by criminal (mafia-type) organizations. 
 
Based on the theoretical relationship between organized crime and economic performance, as 
well as on previous empirical evidence, the presence of mafia-type activity is expected to negatively 
affect productivity growth at firm level. Organized crime increases the costs of economic exchanges 
by increasing uncertainty, operating a monopolistic control over the local market, altering the rules 
of competition among firms, as well as imposing protection rackets to local business actors. In 
addition to these negative direct effects, organized crime is further likely to cancel out any potential 
positive relationships between industrial clustering and firm-level productivity growth. Criminal 
organizations tend to operate in the market through firms they control which may impose the 
acquisition of inputs or business services to other local firms, altering normal production linkages 
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along the supply chain. The presence of criminal organizations also reduces trust and reciprocity in 
the local system, increasing transaction costs among local actors. Therefore, organized crime is 
likely to break established local-level market relationships among firms and prevent the emergence 
of new ones, thus downsizing the positive externalities arising from the spatial concentration of 
market-related firms. 
 
3. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
 
3.1. The dataset 
 
The empirical analysis employs balance sheet data drawn from the AIDA databank (Bureau 
Van Dijk). The dataset has been constructed considering only SMEs – i.e. firms with less than 250 
employees – in the manufacturing industry with a positive turnover and value added over at least 
three consecutive years during the period 2009-2013. In addition, firms included in the analysis 
have to report a value added-to-turnover ratio ≥ 0 and ≤ 1.1 Firms with missing or inconsistent 
value added, total labor cost, tangible assets, and intermediate inputs data have been removed from 
the dataset. This leaves an unbalanced panel including 51,398 firms (for a total of 146,556 
observations over the period 2009-2013), which is used to estimate firm-level TFP. The sample is 
further cleaned by removing firms with missing information about location at province level 
(NUTS-3 level of the European Union territorial classification – Nomenclature des Unités 
Territoriales Statistiques), year of establishment, and amount of investments in 2010. The final 
sample covers 26,812 firms for the period 2010-2013, conditional on being observed in 2010. The 
26,812 firms are used to analyze the effects of industrial clustering and organized crime on 
productivity growth. Tables A1 and A2 in the Appendix display the sample distribution taking into 
account industry and geographic location, respectively.2 
 
3.2. Econometric modeling 
 
In order to investigate whether and how (i) industrial clustering fosters TFP growth at the 
level of the firm and whether and how (ii) organized crime affects TFP growth both directly and 
indirectly, moderating the expected (positive) causal relationship between industrial clustering and 
growth, we specify the following empirical productivity growth equation: 
 
∆𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2010 + 𝛽𝛽2𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2010 + 𝛽𝛽3𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2010 +𝛽𝛽4𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2010 + 𝛽𝛽5𝑂𝑂𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖2010 +𝛽𝛽6�𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2010� × �𝑂𝑂𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖2010� + 𝜸𝜸𝑖𝑖 + 𝜹𝜹𝑚𝑚 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,                                                            (1) 
 
where ∆𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2013 − 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2010  denotes the productivity growth of firm 𝑖𝑖 , operating in 
industry 𝑔𝑔 = 1, … ,18, located in province 𝑝𝑝 = 1, … ,103, over the three-year period 2010-2013; and 
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
2010 and 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2013 denote the natural logarithms of a firm's TFP in 2010 and 2013, respectively. 
 
The TFP of a firm is estimated as the residual of a Cobb-Douglas production function 
specified as follows in logarithmic form: 
 
𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜔𝜔𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,                                                       (2) 
 
where 𝛽𝛽0 represents the mean efficiency level across firms and over time; 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  denotes the value 
added of firm 𝑖𝑖 at time 𝑡𝑡; the terms 𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  and 𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  denote, respectively, capital and labor inputs; the 
term 𝜔𝜔𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 represents productivity shocks potentially observed or that can be predicted by the firm 
when making inputs' decisions, and thus influencing its decision process; and the term 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  is an 
independent and identically distributed component which represents productivity shocks not 
affecting a firm's decision process (Ackerberg, Caves, & Frazer, 2015; Olley and Pakes, 1996; Van 
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Beveren, 2012). Hence, the estimated firm-level productivity can be computed solving for 𝜔𝜔𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 as 
follows: 
 
𝜔𝜔�𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 − ?̂?𝛽𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 − ?̂?𝛽𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖. 
 
Firm-level TFP is firstly estimated through the two-step semi-parametric approach proposed 
by Levinsohn and Petrin (2003). This approach allows the possibility of correcting for the 
simultaneity bias, referring to some form of endogeneity in the inputs due to the correlation between 
the level of inputs chosen by the firm, based on its prior beliefs on productivity levels, and 
unobservable productivity shocks (Syverson, 2011; Van Beveren, 2012). Levinsohn and Petrin 
(2003) use intermediate inputs (𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) to proxy for unobserved productivity, solving the simultaneity 
problem between input choices and productivity shocks. By specifying 𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖(𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝜔𝜔𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖)  and 
under the assumptions of monotonicity and intermediate inputs strictly increasing in productivity, 
Equation (2) can be re-specified as follows: 
 
𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖(𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖, 
 
where 𝜔𝜔𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖(𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) expresses the unobserved productivity as a function of observables, and 
the term 𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖(𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) = 𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖−1(𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝜔𝜔𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) denotes the inversion of the intermediate inputs function. 
 
Although the simultaneity bias can be corrected using Levinsohn and Petrin's (2003) 
approach, potential collinearity of the labor coefficient is likely to emerge in the first-stage 
estimation (Van Beveren, 2012). This collinearity may be the consequence of choosing labor and 
intermediate inputs simultaneously. In this case, both factors are assumed to be allocated in a 
similar way by the firm, as a function of productivity and capital input and, therefore, depend on the 
same state variables, i.e. 𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖(𝜔𝜔𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) and 𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = ℎ𝑖𝑖(𝜔𝜔𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖). As shown by Ackerberg et al. 
(2015), the labor coefficient results not identified in the first-stage because it is not possible to 
estimate the non-parametric function of productivity and capital input with the labor variable's 
coefficient simultaneously, as the labor input is a function of productivity and capital input. 
 
According to Wooldridge (2009), the estimator proposed by Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) can 
be implemented using a Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) approach where 𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘 and 𝛽𝛽𝑙𝑙 are 
estimated in one step, addressing the possible collinearity between labor and intermediate inputs. 
This approach consists in the simultaneous estimation of two equations with the same dependent 
variable and the same set of input variables, while different sets of instruments are specified so that 
the coefficients of the input variables in the first equation are identified exploiting information in 
the second equation. Given a production function (2), and assuming absence of correlation of 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
with current and past values of capital, labor and intermediate inputs as well as restriction of the 
dynamics of the unobserved productivity component 𝜔𝜔𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖, Wooldridge (2009) proposes to identify 
𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘 and 𝛽𝛽𝑙𝑙 estimating the following two equations: 
 
�
𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑓𝑓(𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖                         
𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + ℎ[𝑓𝑓(𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1,𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1)] + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 , 
 
where 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 denotes productivity innovations and correlates with 𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 and 𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖, while it is uncorrelated 
with 𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖, and all past values of 𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖, 𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖, and 𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖. The function 𝑓𝑓(∙) can be specified as a low-degree 
polynomial of order up to three, while the function ℎ(∙) (i.e. the productivity process) can be 
defined as a random walk with drift, such that 𝜔𝜔𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝜏𝜏 + 𝜔𝜔𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1 + 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖. Equation (2) can thus be re-
specified as follows (Galuščák and Lízal, 2011): 
 
𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = (𝛽𝛽0 + 𝜏𝜏) + 𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑓𝑓(𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1,𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1) + 𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖, 
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and can be estimated through an IV approach, using polynomials in 𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1 and 𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1 of order up to 
three approximating for 𝑓𝑓(∙), and 𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 , 𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1 , 𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1 , 𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1  and polynomials containing 𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1  and 
𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1 of order up to three, as instruments for 𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (Petrin and Levinsohn, 2012). 
 
Finally, firm-level TFP is estimated following Ackerberg et al. (2015) when responding to 
Levinsohn and Petrin's (2003) approach. The two-step semi-parametric approach proposed by 
Ackerberg et al. (2015) differs from that of Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) in offering to specify an 
intermediate inputs function for 𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 to control for unobserved productivity, which is conditional on 
the labor input (𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖). Under the same assumption of strict monotonicity of intermediate inputs in 
productivity, Ackerberg et al. (2015) specify 𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖(𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖, 𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝜔𝜔𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) , such that unobserved 
productivity can be expressed as a function of observables through the inverted inputs demand 
function 𝜔𝜔𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖(𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖, 𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖). Then, Equation (2) can be re-specified as follows: 
 
𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖(𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖, 𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖, 
 
with 𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖(𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖, 𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) = 𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖−1(𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖, 𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝜔𝜔𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖). 
 
Eighteen production functions are estimated at the industry level using the three different 
estimation approaches.3 Table A3 in the Appendix reports some descriptive statistics and the 
correlation matrix of the variables entering the production function, while Table A4 reports the 
estimated elasticities of the capital and labor inputs.4 
 
The key explanatory variables entering the productivity growth equation are those capturing 
organized crime and industrial clustering. The variable capturing organized crime (𝑂𝑂𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖2010 ) is 
defined considering three main types of crime: (i) mafia-type association (𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖2010), (ii) 
mafia-murders (𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖2010), and (iii) extortions (𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖2010). The variable is operationalized 
as follows (e.g. Gibbons, 2004): 
 
𝑂𝑂𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖
2010 = ln�𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖2010 + 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖2010 + 𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖2010
𝑆𝑆𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖
� ,                      (3) 
 
where 𝑆𝑆𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖 denotes the area of province 𝑝𝑝. Data on criminality are drawn from the Istat online 
databank Territorial Information System on Justice. The province is used as the geographic unit of 
analysis. No finer geographical scale can be employed, as crime geographic data are only provided 
at the level of the 103 Italian provinces. Figure A1 in the Appendix displays the quartile map of the 
organized crime variable. As expected there is a concentration of reported organized crime in the 
South of Italy (the Mezzogiorno) and, particularly, in the regions of Apulia, Calabria, Campania, 
and Sicily. However, parts of the Mezzogiorno, such as Sardinia, are relatively organized-crime-
free, while mafia-type activities are strong in some Northern and Central Italian provinces, such as 
Milan, Prato, Rome, Trieste, Varese, Rimini, or Biella. 
 
The variable capturing industrial clustering ( 𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2010 ) is defined considering input-output 
relationships among industries and, specifically, it is constructed to account for both horizontal (i.e. 
intra-industry) and vertical (i.e. inter-industry) market relationships as follows (Cainelli et al., 
2016): 
 
𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
2010 = ln
⎩
⎨
⎧��𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
2010 − 1� ∙ 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2010� + ∑ �𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗2010 ∙ 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗2010�𝐽𝐽𝑗𝑗=1
𝑗𝑗≠𝑖𝑖
𝑆𝑆𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖
⎭
⎬
⎫ ,                          (4) 
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where 𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2010 denotes the number of active firms operating in industry 𝑔𝑔 and located in province 𝑝𝑝; 
𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗
2010  represents the number of active firms in industry 𝑗𝑗, with 𝑗𝑗 ≠ 𝑔𝑔; 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2010  and 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗2010  are the 
weights capturing the share of inputs that firms in industry 𝑔𝑔 may acquire from, respectively, the 
same industry and other industries. The reference firm is subtracted from the computation in order 
to consider the effective number of local potential suppliers.5 Data on the number of active firms are 
drawn from the Movimprese database, provided by the Italian Chamber of Commerce. The 
weighting components are derived from the 2010 use table of the Italian input-output matrix 
provided by Istat.6 
 
A cluster can be defined as a geographic concentration of related firms (as well as 
organizations and institutions) in a given territory (Delgado et al., 2016; Porter, 1990). The 
industrial clustering variable defined in Equation (4) represents both a measure of geographic 
concentration of the economic activity and a proxy of the intensity of the input-output relationships 
among firms. The value of the variable increases as the density of market-interconnected firms 
grows. From an agglomeration literature perspective, this variable captures the effects of both 
localization and (vertically-)related diversification economies (Cainelli et al., 2016; Frenken, Van 
Oort, & Verburg, 2007). With respect to a standard agglomeration measure capturing a mass effect 
of either localization or diversification economies, the industrial clustering variable proposed in 
Equation (4) has the advantage of simultaneously accounting for horizontal and vertical market-
based relationships. In fact, it weights the number of neighboring local firms by the effective 
contribution to the reference firm's inputs procurement. For this reason, it represents a better proxy 
for industrial clustering forces. 
 
Equation (1) also includes the interaction term between the industrial clustering and organized 
crime variables. The introduction of the interaction is aimed at evaluating whether organized crime 
plays an indirect negative effect on a firm's productivity growth by limiting the (potential) positive 
effects of industrial clustering through the reduction of trust among economic actors, the increase of 
transaction costs, as well as the alteration of competition/cooperation mechanisms across firms at 
the local level. 
 
The right-hand side of the productivity growth equation includes a set of firm-level control 
variables: the log-transformed, beginning-of-the period TFP (𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2010); a measure of firm age 
(𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2010), defined as the log-transformed difference between the year 2010 and the year the firm 
was set up; a size dummy variable for larger firms (𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2010), defined around the median value of 
the 2010 employment distribution.7 Equation (1) includes also a set of industry dummy variables 
(𝜸𝜸𝑖𝑖) to capture industry fixed effects, and a set of geographic dummy variables (𝜹𝜹𝑚𝑚) defined at 
NUTS-1 level to take into account structural differences among Italian macro-areas in terms of 
socio-economic conditions, industrial development, and infrastructure endowment. Tables A5 to A8 
in the Appendix report the descriptive statistics and correlation matrices of the dependent and main 
explanatory variables. 
 
3.3. Identification strategy 
 
As the simple Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimation of Equation (1) may be affected by 
sample selection – the productivity growth is observed only for the sub-sample of firms surviving 
over the growth period (e.g. Sleutjes, Van Oort, & Schutjens, 2012) –, we resort to a two-step 
sample-selection model à la Heckman (1979). This model is estimated to account for firm exit over 
the period 2010-2013. Specifically, a first-stage reduced-form selection equation is estimated by 
Maximum Likelihood specifying a dummy as dependent variable. The dummy equals one if the 
firm observed in 2010 is still accounted for in 2013, and zero otherwise. The selection equation is 
identified by including on its right-hand side all the explanatory variables specified in Equation (1), 
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plus an exclusion restriction which is defined, following Griffith, Redding, and Simpson (2009), as 
a third-order polynomial expansion 𝜑𝜑(∙) in firm age, capital stock, and investment – all variables 
are log-transformed and refer to the beginning of the growth period (see also Olley and Pakes, 
1996). The selection equation is estimated on the whole sample of firms through a Probit model. 
Then, the inverse Mills ratio (𝜆𝜆) is computed from the estimated selection equation and is included 
as an additional regressor in the productivity growth equation to correct for sample selection bias. 
The augmented Equation (1) is thus estimated via OLS on the sub-sample of firms surviving over 
the growth period 2010-2013 (Wooldridge, 2010). 
 
A second critical issue which may affect the OLS estimation of Equation (1) – after correction 
for the sample selection bias – concerns the potential endogeneity of the variables for industrial 
clustering (e.g. Graham, Melo, Jiwattanakulpaisarn, & Noland, 2010; Martin et al., 2011; Rosenthal 
and Strange, 2004) and organized crime (e.g. Albanese and Marinelli, 2013). Endogeneity can occur 
in the context of Equation (1) for several reasons: (i) shocks at province level may affect the 
productivity growth of firms, as well as the local industrial structure and the level of criminality; (ii) 
measuring industrial relationships among firms and the criminal activity is not an easy task; (iii) the 
most productive firms may self-select into the most agglomerated areas, or move towards more 
secure business environments. 
 
Therefore, Equation (1) is estimated by applying an IV approach and, specifically, a two-stage 
least squares (TSLS) estimator. As the identification of a good instrument – i.e. one correlated with 
the endogenous variable without affecting the dependent variable (Greene, 2003) – may be a hard 
task, previous research on both the agglomeration economics and crime literature has proposed 
alternative approaches. Often, current values of agglomeration variables are instrumented using 
their long-lagged values (e.g. Ciccone and Hall, 1996), while measures of organized crime have 
been instrumented using geographic or historical variables to capture the institutional, socio-
economic, and environmental features of the places where organized crime originally emerged (e.g. 
Albanese and Marinelli, 2013; Barone and Narciso, 2015). However, as the aim of our research is to 
investigate whether industrial clustering and organized crime influence firm-level productivity 
growth across Italian provinces, both in the areas where organized crime originated (parts of the 
Mezzogiorno) as well as in those where it has appeared more recently (Northern and Central 
provinces), our identification strategy does not rely on geographic or historical factors. Instead, it 
follows Autor and Duggan's (2003) modification to the shift-share approach originally proposed by 
Bartik (1991) and largely employed in different fields (e.g. Ascani and Gagliardi, 2015; Buonanno 
and Pazzona, 2014; Faggio and Overman, 2014; Moretti, 2010). 
 
The proposed IV approach considers industry and crime shares, respectively, defined at the 
province level for the year 2007, as well as changes at the national level over the 2007-2010 period, 
to instrument the 2010 variables capturing industrial clustering and organized crime. The rationale 
underlying the instruments is that each province would have observed a change of its industrial 
structure and criminality level over the 2007-2010 period which is proportional to its beginning-of-
the period conditions in absence of province-specific shocks. The IV constructed to instrument the 
industrial clustering variable (𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼) takes into account industry variations and is defined as follows: 
 
𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖
𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 = ��� 𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2007
∑ 𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
2007𝐺𝐺
𝑖𝑖=1
� ∙ �ln�𝑁𝑁(−𝑖𝑖)𝑖𝑖2010 � − ln�𝑁𝑁(−𝑖𝑖)𝑖𝑖2007 ���𝐺𝐺
𝑖𝑖=1
, 
 
where 𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2007 denotes the number of firms operating in industry 𝑔𝑔 and located in province 𝑝𝑝 in 2007, 
while the terms 𝑁𝑁(−𝑖𝑖)𝑖𝑖2007  and 𝑁𝑁(−𝑖𝑖)𝑖𝑖2010  denote the number of firms operating in industry 𝑔𝑔  at the 
national level, excluding the province 𝑝𝑝 , in 2007 and 2010, respectively. All industries are 
considered in constructing the IV. The objective is to capture changes in the industrial structure of a 
10 
province which would affect a firm's current possibility for inputs' procurement. The IV constructed 
to instrument the organized crime variable (𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑂𝑂𝐼𝐼) accounts for crime variations and is defined as 
follows: 
 
𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖
𝑂𝑂𝐼𝐼 = ��� 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝2007
∑ 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝
2007𝐼𝐼
𝑝𝑝=1
� ∙ �ln�𝑆𝑆(−𝑖𝑖)𝑝𝑝2010 � − ln�𝑆𝑆(−𝑖𝑖)𝑝𝑝2007 ���𝐼𝐼
𝑝𝑝=1
, 
 
where 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝2007 denotes the number of crimes of type 𝑎𝑎 recorded in province 𝑝𝑝 in 2007, while the terms 
𝑆𝑆(−𝑖𝑖)𝑝𝑝2007  and 𝑆𝑆(−𝑖𝑖)𝑝𝑝2010  denote the number of crimes of type 𝑎𝑎 at the national level, excluding the province 
𝑝𝑝 , in 2007 and 2010, respectively. As the organized crime variable defined in Equation (3) 
represents only a proxy for the real phenomenon (e.g. Calderoni, 2011), all crimes classified by Istat 
– beyond mafia-type ones – are considered when constructing the IV. The aim is to better capture 
changes in criminal activity at the province level.8 
 
The intuition behind the identification strategy relies on the pre-crisis composition of the local 
industrial and crime structures, together with their national changes over the crisis, to exploit the 
geographic variability of the effects induced by the crisis in Italy. Looking at the industrial 
dimension, the economic downturn could have been more severe in provinces where the local, pre-
crisis industrial structure was driven by sectors more exposed to international interactions. This 
scenario, in turn, could have induced a process of re-configuration of the local industrial structure 
during the crisis driven by national sectoral dynamics, with consequences on firm-level opportunity 
for local market transactions in the post-crisis period. Looking at the crime dimension, previous 
empirical contributions suggest that economic-related crimes tend to increase in periods of 
economic downturn (e.g. de Blasio, Maggio, & Menon, 2016; Edmark, 2005). In absence of 
province-specific shocks related to the crisis, crime-specific variations at the national level during 
the crisis would have been allocated proportionally to the pre-crisis local shares. By contrast, 
individuals living in provinces that suffered more the effects of the crisis could have had higher 
incentives to engage in criminal activities. Similarly, businesses run in provinces recording a higher 
downturn during the crisis could have more easily fallen prey to criminal organizations. 
Furthermore, local industrial and crime dynamics may have observed a certain degree of correlation 
as a consequence of the economic downturn; provinces more deeply affected on the industrial side 
could have also witnessed an escalation in criminal activity resulting, for example, from increased 
unemployment and the financial weakness or bankruptcy of local firms – which, in turn, could have 
eased the path for criminal organizations to take control over the local market. 
 
In addition to the relevance of the IVs, it is crucial that neither the nationwide shocks nor the 
pre-crisis shares are directly correlated with firms' TFP growth over the 2010-2013 period. The 
exclusion of the province-specific contribution to the national changes during the crisis reduces this 
risk (e.g. Faggio and Overman, 2014). Moreover, as in Ascani and Gagliardi (2015) and Faggio and 
Overman (2014) in the context of cross-sectional analyses, the exogeneity of the IVs is further 
strengthened by the use of lagged (and pre-crisis) shares − see also de Blasio et al. (2016) in the 
context of panel data. 
 
The issues of sample selection and endogenous regressors have been addressed 
simultaneously following Wooldridge (2010, pp. 809−813). Specifically, the right-hand side of the 
first-stage, reduced-form selection equation is specified including all the exogenous variables 
entering the second-stage equation, plus the instruments identified for the endogenous variables 
instead of the endogenous variables themselves. Consequently, the structural (i.e. the productivity 
growth) equation is estimated via TSLS including the inverse Mills ratio derived from the selection 
equation as additional regressor. 
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4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
4.1. Main results 
 
Table 1 reports results of the OLS estimation of Equation (1), corrected for sample selection. 
The null hypothesis testing the exclusion restriction 𝜑𝜑(∙)  in the selection equation is always 
rejected, and the parameter 𝜆𝜆 (i.e. the inverse Mills ratio computed from the selection equation) is 
statistically significant in all specifications. This indicates the need to correct for sample selection 
and the validity of the adopted strategy. Moreover, the mean variance inflation factor (VIF) is lower 
than the conservative cut-off value of 10 in all specifications, suggesting the absence of 
multicollinearity problems. 
 
The results of specification (1) – estimated without including the interaction term between the 
variables for industrial clustering and organized crime – point to, as hypothesized, a negative effect 
of organized crime on firm-level productivity growth. They also highlight the presence of a positive 
link between industrial clustering and productivity growth. In this respect, the results confirm 
previous findings on both the relationship between organized crime and firm productivity (e.g. 
Albanese and Marinelli, 2013) and on the relationship between industrial clustering and 
productivity (e.g. Cainelli et al., 2016). Regarding the controls, the beginning-of-the period TFP 
variable has negative coefficients, as do the age and size variables. 
 
[place Table 1 here] 
 
Specification (2) complements specification (1) by identifying a negative indirect effect of 
organized crime on the relationship between industrial clustering and productivity growth. The 
coefficients of the interaction term are negative and statistically significant, implying that any 
positive effect arising from the geographic concentration of (intra- and inter-industry) market-
related firms decreases as the incidence of local organized crime increases. Table 2 allows 
discerning the dimension of the moderation effect of organized crime on the industrial clustering-
productivity growth relationship, as it reports the TFP growth elasticity of industrial clustering 
estimated at selected percentiles of the organized crime variable. The estimated elasticity decreases 
as the level of organized crime increases. Following Ackerberg et al.'s (2015) approach to TFP 
estimation, the results reveal that a 1 percent increase in the level of industrial clustering is 
associated with a 4.4 percent increase of productivity growth, when the value of organized crime is 
in the 1st percentile of its distribution; with a 2.8 percent increase of productivity growth, when the 
value of organized crime is in the 50th percentile of its distribution; and with a non-statistically 
significant 1.1 percent increase of productivity growth, when the value of organized crime is in the 
99th percentile of its distribution. 
 
[place Table 2 here] 
 
The results of the analysis thus confirm the theoretical predictions. On the one hand, firms 
located in local systems characterized by a high density of market-related firms (i.e. surrounded by 
a high number of potential suppliers) benefit from agglomeration externalities related to the local 
availability of suppliers, the reduction of transport costs, as well as the reduction of transaction 
costs associated with increasing trust among local business partners. On the other hand, organized 
crime reduces trust among individuals, alters competition, and undermines the established local 
industrial structure, causing a weakening of existing market relationships among local firms. 
Organized crime therefore leads to an increase in the costs of the economic activity and to a 
significant reduction of the advantages related to economics of agglomeration, producing a clear 
decrease in firm-level efficiency. 
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The robustness of the results is tested by controlling for the potential endogeneity of the 
variables capturing industrial clustering and organized crime. Re-location processes of the most 
productive firms towards the most agglomerated areas, or towards areas characterized by lower 
levels of criminality, may cause biases in the estimated coefficients due to reverse causality. Table 3 
reports results of the TSLS estimation of Equation (1) aimed at controlling for the potential 
endogeneity. Similarly to the exogenous analysis, the null hypothesis testing the exclusion 
restriction 𝜑𝜑(∙) in the selection equation is always rejected, and the parameter 𝜆𝜆  is statistically 
significant. First-stage F statistics on the endogenous variables are higher than the conservative cut-
off value of 10 in all specifications and, as before, the mean VIF is lower than the cut-off value of 
10. 
 
[place Table 3 here] 
 
Overall, the findings reported above are confirmed when controlling for endogeneity. There is 
a negative direct effect of organized crime on productivity growth and a positive one of industrial 
clustering. The results also confirm an indirect negative effect of organized crime on the positive 
relationship between industrial clustering and productivity growth. As Table 4 shows, the 
dimensions of this effect are quite high: a 1 percent increase in the level of industrial clustering is 
associated with a 19.2 percent increase of productivity growth, when the value of organized crime is 
in the 1st percentile of its distribution; with a 4.9 percent increase of productivity growth, when the 
value of organized crime is in the 50th percentile of its distribution; and with a non-statistically 
significant 3.4 percent increase of productivity growth, when the value of organized crime is in the 
75th percentile of its distribution – see Ackerberg et al.'s (2015) approach to TFP estimation. 
 
[place Table 4 here] 
 
Once endogeneity is controlled for, the negative indirect effect of organized crime increases, 
making the positive marginal effect of industrial clustering on productivity growth negligible for 
high levels of organized crime. The presence of criminal organizations alters the local industrial 
structure and the established market relationships among firms, meaning that the positive 
agglomeration externalities stemming from the geographic concentration of suppliers disappear in 
areas characterized by a high incidence of organized crime. Negligible agglomeration externalities 
are a consequence of the presence of protection rackets, high extortion, and "illicit" firms in the 
local productive cluster, which leads to increasing costs (e.g. higher acquisition costs, higher 
transaction costs, as well as the imposition of taxes to stay in the market) for "legal" firms. 
 
Furthermore, Equation (1) is modified to test whether the negative moderation effect of 
organized crime on the industrial clustering-productivity growth relationship differs for firms of 
different sizes. The idea is that the effects of organized crime are likely to be greater for smaller 
firms because they have less available resources and less market power with respect to larger firms. 
Smaller firms may have more difficulties for competing in a market dominated by criminal 
organizations, which operate imposing protection rackets and the acquisition of inputs from 
controlled "illicit" firms. Moreover, violent actions towards employers and firms' assets in order to 
gain the control of the local market may act as a greater deterrent for smaller firms, simply by virtue 
of their size. 
 
Table 5 reports the results of the TSLS estimation of the augmented version of Equation (1), 
which includes both two-way interactions of the industrial clustering and organized crime variables 
with the size dummy variable, and a three-way interaction term among the three variables. 
Diagnostics on the sample selection issue confirm the empirical approach adopted, and the first-
stage F statistics are larger than the conservative cut-off value of 10 in all specifications. 
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[place Table 5 here] 
 
Table 6 reports the TFP growth elasticities of industrial clustering and organized crime 
corresponding to specifications (1) in Table 5. These elasticities estimate the direct effects by size 
class. The results indicate that, first, smaller firms benefit more from the local availability of input 
suppliers than larger ones. Second, their growth seems to be negatively affected by organized crime 
more than that of larger firms, although this result is marginally reversed when firm-level TFP is 
estimated following Ackerberg et al. (2015). 
 
[place Table 6 here] 
 
The above results are further confirmed by Table 7, which shows that the indirect negative 
effect of organized crime is higher for smaller than for larger firms. For example, following 
Ackerberg et al.'s (2015) TFP estimation approach, a 21 percent decline in agglomeration benefits 
for smaller firms is evident when moving from the 1st to the 25th percentile of the organized crime 
variable's distribution, while a 5.1 percent decline emerges for larger firms. Similarly, smaller firms 
suffer a 5.1 percent decline moving from the 25th to the 50th percentile, while larger firms suffer a 
1.2 percent decline. Moreover, the estimated elasticity is positive but non-significant at the 75th 
percentile for smaller firms, while positive and statistically significant for larger firms. Finally, 
negative agglomeration externalities arise for smaller firms when the value of organized crime 
variables is in the 99th percentile of its distribution, while the effect becomes negligible for larger 
firms at the same value of the organized crime variable. 
 
[place Table 7 here] 
 
4.2. Robustness tests 
 
A series of tests has been performed to assess the role of some potential drawbacks related to 
the empirical analysis and, thus, to check the robustness of the main findings. All the Tables 
presenting these results are reported in the Appendix. 
 
First, the OLS and TSLS estimations of Equation (1) are replicated using an alternative 
measure of firm-level performance, i.e. labor productivity – computed as deflated value added per 
employee. The rationale of this exercise is that firm-level TFP estimation presents several 
drawbacks. As shown in Tables A9 and A10, the main findings obtained using the three alternative 
measures of TFP are confirmed. 
 
Second, as Table A5 in the Appendix reports, the mean value of the TFP growth variables is 
negative. This negative average firm-level growth could be a consequence of the post-crisis period 
investigated. Therefore, the TSLS estimation of Equation (1) is replicated using the 2013 
productivity level as dependent variable. As Tables A11 and A12 show, the results confirm the 
previous findings both using a measure of TFP and a measure of labor productivity to proxy for 
firm-level performance. 
 
Third, the TSLS estimation of Equation (1) is reproduced using an alternative proxy to 
capture local agglomeration forces. Following Cainelli et al. (2016), the industrial clustering 
variable is replaced by a simple measure of geographic concentration of industries (𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2010) defined 
as follows: 
 
𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
2010 = ln�𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2010 − 1
𝑆𝑆𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖
�, 
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where all terms are defined as in Equation (4). Although the geographic concentration variable does 
not represent a proxy for the whole dynamics of market-based relationships among firms, as it does 
not take into account inter-industry transactions, it may be useful to check the robustness of the 
results under the rationale that inputs' procurement in manufacturing industries is manly driven by 
horizontal (i.e. intra-industry) transactions.9 As shown in Tables A13 and A14, the results confirm 
the previous findings obtained using the industrial clustering variable, which captured both intra- 
and inter-industry market-based transactions. 
 
Fourth, the robustness of the results is tested using an alternative variable for organized crime 
which accounts for attacks and criminal conspiracy, besides the mafia-association, the mafia-
murder and the extortion crimes. The rationale underlying this alternative specification of the 
organized crime variable refers to the complexity of properly reflecting such an ample and varied 
phenomenon, which official statistics on criminal activity can hardly capture (Calderoni, 2011). As 
Tables A15 and A16 suggest, the previous findings are once again confirmed, although this 
alternative organized crime variable still represents a poor proxy for the organized crime 
phenomenon. 
 
Fifth, the TSLS estimation of Equation (1) is reproduced without controlling for the sample 
selection bias, i.e. without including the estimated inverse Mills ratio as additional regressor. This 
exercise aims at verifying that the results on the coefficients of interest are not driven by the 
arbitrary exclusion restriction identifying the selection equation. The results reported in Tables A17 
and A18, once again, confirm the main ones. 
 
Finally, the robustness of the results is tested using an alternative approach to estimate firms' 
TFP. The Levinsohn and Petrin's (2003) approach has been modified to account for endogenous 
firm exit in a similar fashion to Olley and Pakes (1996): specifically, a firm's probability of exiting 
the sample is modeled through a third-order polynomial function in intermediate inputs and capital 
input. As Tables A19 and A20 show, the results are robust to this different TFP estimation 
approach. 
 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
 
This paper makes inroads into the understanding of the mechanisms underlying the 
relationship between the local environment where firms operate and their economic performance. 
Specifically, it has focused on whether and to which extent organized crime (mafia-type 
criminality) affects a firm's performance (defined in terms of TFP growth) both directly and 
indirectly, by downsizing any positive externalities arising from the geographic concentration of 
(intra- and inter-industry) market-related firms. 
 
The analysis is conducted using a large sample of Italian manufacturing SMEs over the period 
2010-2013, on which a two-step sample-selection model has been estimated to control for a 
potential selection bias of the surviving firms. The robustness of the results has been tested through 
an IV approach to control for the endogeneity of the variables capturing organized crime and 
industrial clustering. Three different approaches have also been employed to estimate firm-level 
TFP and several robustness exercises have been performed. 
 
The empirical results demonstrate the presence of a negative (direct) effect of organized crime 
on firm-level productivity growth. The negative influence of organized crime is also indirect, as 
mafia-type associations, extortions, and murders create local conditions that undermine the positive 
effect of industrial clustering on productivity growth. Moreover, this negative moderation effect is 
more detrimental for smaller than for larger firms. The positive impact of industrial clustering 
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decreases as the level of organized crime at the local level increases, to the extent that it becomes 
negative in those areas with particularly high levels of criminality – specifically, for small firms. 
 
These results can be interpreted considering two interrelated consequences of criminal 
activity. On the one hand, criminal organizations gain from the economic control of specific 
productions and, therefore, may influence their dynamics. On the other hand, the presence of 
criminal organizations also reduces trust and reciprocity among individuals, increasing transaction 
costs, thus contributing to make the local business environment less competitive. This produces 
negative externalities on local market-based relationships among firms: market transactions become 
more expensive, in particular if the criminal organization imposes, as is normally the case, 
protection rackets and other illegal payments on the local firms. Hence, high levels of organized 
crime destabilize traditional competition/cooperation relationships existing among firms within a 
locality. Smaller firms and businesses are the greatest victims. These aspects contribute to 
determine the negative (indirect) effect which can be ascribed to the presence of criminal 
organizations: they influence firms' performance increasing the costs of the economic activity, as 
well as altering the mechanisms which determine the positive effect of industrial agglomeration on 
firm-level growth. 
 
The results underline the importance of the local context on firm-level performance, beyond 
the traditional firm-specific characteristics (Fitjar and Rodríguez-Pose, 2015). In particular, they 
highlight the relevance of accounting for different dimensions of the local environment where firms 
operate, as well as how these local-level factors interact with one another in order to determine the 
economic behavior of firms. From a theoretical and an empirical point of view, the results of the 
analysis open new questions concerning the dynamics of the relationship between agglomeration 
forces and the performance of firms. They hint at the fact that the local context – and at how 
different factors external to the firm combine in the local environment – alters the way in which 
firms behave, innovate, perform, and benefit from spatial agglomeration. From a policy perspective, 
the results point to the need of targeting industrial policies not only at the level of the firm but 
addressing local bottlenecks that may limit the capacity of firms to be created, operate, and thrive in 
particular areas of Italy or elsewhere in the world. Organized crime is one of these bottlenecks and 
tackling it would represent a significant boost to productivity and, consequently, to the economic 
dynamism of firms, cities, and territories. 
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ENDNOTES 
 
1. The analysis focuses only on manufacturing industries because the balance sheet data available 
for services firms are less complete and reliable than those available for manufacturing firms. 
The analysis focuses on firms' TFP (growth), which is estimated using balance sheet data. 
 
2. Firms are ascribed to different industries and sectors following the Ateco 2007 classification of 
economic activities. All two-digit manufacturing sectors are considered, except for the sectors 
"12 – Tobacco products" and "33 – Repair and installation of machinery and equipment", due to 
the absence of firms after the cleaning procedure. 
 
3. Deflated balance sheet data on value added, total labor cost, intermediate inputs and tangible 
assets are used to estimate the industry-specific production functions. Value added (𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) is 
deflated with the corresponding production price index and is used as output in the production 
functions; total labor cost (𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) is deflated with the corresponding wage index and is used as 
labor input; total tangible assets (𝐾𝐾𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) are deflated with the corresponding capital deflator and 
are used as capital input; intermediate inputs (𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) are defined (at current prices) as the sum of 
services, raw materials and consumptions. They are deflated with an intermediate consumptions 
index. Deflators are calculated using Istat (Italian National Institute of Statistics) data and the 
reference year for depreciation is 2006. TFP is estimated at the industry level, rather than at the 
two-digit sector level. This is done in order to maintain the same industrial level of aggregation, 
as the 2010 input-output data used to construct the variable capturing industrial clustering are 
only available for the 19 industries specified in Table A1. 
 
4. The estimated inputs' elasticities reported in Table A4 indicate low returns to scale 
independently of the estimation approach considered. These results could be explained 
considering two different aspects. First, the estimation of firm-level TFP presents several 
drawbacks as different estimation techniques tend to take into account only one or two issues 
simultaneously. This is despite the fact that the literature has emphasized several problems other 
than endogeneity and input choice – e.g. omitted price bias and optimal level of analysis (firm, 
plant or product) – that also need to be addressed (Van Beveren, 2012). Second, these results 
could depend on the firm-level balance sheet data used in the estimation procedure, as they are 
close to results obtained in other research using the same (e.g. Ganau, 2016; Lasagni et al., 
2015) or similar (e.g. Albanese and Marinelli, 2013; Di Giacinto, Gomellini, Micucci, & 
Pagnini, 2014) data sources. 
 
5. The literature has focused on different dimensions of the cluster phenomenon. For instance, 
Feser (2005) and Feser and Bergman (2000) analyze the input-output component of industrial 
clusters, while Feldman and Audretsch (1999) and Koo (2005) focus on knowledge-based 
clusters. Delgado, Porter, and Stern (2016) propose a measure of inter-industry linkages which 
is based on the co-location pattern of employment and establishments, input-output linkages and 
shared jobs, and which allows for the comparison of clustering phenomena across regions. 
 
6. The weighting scheme has been defined excluding public services (e.g. defense, public 
administration, public infrastructures, etc.), domestic services, education, restaurants and leisure 
activities, construction, real estate, and commercial activities. These industries have not been 
considered because their supplied inputs are not directly employed in the production processes 
by manufacturing firms. In particular, commercial firms have been excluded because they act as 
intermediaries and they are not specific with regard to the inputs sold (Cainelli et al., 2016). 
 
7. The dummy variable for large size firms equals one if the firm has a minimum of 15 employees, 
while it equals zero if the firm has 14 employees or less. The choice of splitting the sample 
17 
around the median value is driven by the highly skewed nature of the 2010 employment 
distribution (see Figure A2 in the Appendix). 
 
8. The correlation coefficient between organized crime and non-organized crime per square 
kilometer in 2010 is equal to 0.798. 7 percent of Italian provinces lie in the 90th percentile of 
both distributions. 
 
9. According to the 2010 Italian use table, the highest pairwise share of inputs acquired by all but 
four manufacturing industries refers to intra-industry inputs' procurement. 
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TABLE 1: OLS results 
Dependent variable ∆TFPipg (LP) ∆TFPipg (W) ∆TFPipg (ACF) 
Specification (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) TFPipg2010  -0.394**** -0.394**** -0.398**** -0.398**** -0.416**** -0.416**** 
 (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.018) (0.018) AGEipg2010  -0.044**** -0.044**** -0.044**** -0.044**** -0.030**** -0.031**** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) SIZE_CLASSipg2010  -0.056*** -0.057*** -0.060*** -0.061*** -0.038** -0.039** 
 (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.019) (0.019) ICpg2010  0.043**** 0.016 0.042**** 0.015 0.027*** 0.008 
 (0.009) (0.013) (0.009) (0.013) (0.009) (0.013) OCp2010  -0.029**** -0.033**** -0.028**** -0.033**** -0.015** -0.019** 
 (0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) ICpg2010 × OCp2010  … -0.007*** … -0.007*** … -0.005* 
  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003) 
𝜆𝜆  -0.707**** -0.710**** -0.692**** -0.695**** -0.280**** -0.283**** 
 (0.075) (0.074) (0.073) (0.073) (0.058) (0.058) Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
NUTS-1 Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of Firms 17,961 17,961 17,961 17,961 17,961 17,961 
R2 0.11 0.11 0.12 0.12 0.14 0.14 
Adjusted R2 0.11 0.11 0.12 0.12 0.14 0.14 
Model F statistic [p-value] 19.61 [0.000] 19.07 [0.000] 19.93 [0.000] 19.39 [0.000] 24.06 [0.000] 23.36 [0.000] 
Mean VIF 3.88 4.48 3.86 4.46 3.65 4.26 
Elasticity of ICpg2010 0.043**** 0.044**** 0.042**** 0.043**** 0.027*** 0.027*** 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) Selection Equation       Number of Firms 26,812 26,812 26,812 26,812 26,812 26,812 
Pseudo R2 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 
Model Wald 𝜒𝜒2 [p-value] 1,915.26 [0.000] 1,922.50 [0.000] 1,909.69 [0.000] 1,917.20 [0.000] 1,914.24 [0.000] 1,919.73 [0.000] 
H0: 𝜑𝜑(∙) = 0 216.85 [0.000] 217.59 [0.000] 221.85 [0.000] 222.58 [0.000] 278.14 [0.000] 278.87 [0.000] 
Notes: *𝑝𝑝 < 0.1; **𝑝𝑝 < 0.05; ***𝑝𝑝 < 0.01; ****𝑝𝑝 < 0.001. Bootstrapped (1,000 replications) standard errors are shown in parentheses, and they are clustered 
at the province-industry level. All specifications include a constant term. LP denotes Levinsohn and Petrin's (2003) approach, W denotes Wooldridge's (2009) 
approach, while ACF denotes Ackerberg et al.'s (2015) approach to firms' TFP estimation. 𝜆𝜆 denotes the inverse Mills ratio from the first-stage selection 
equations. 𝜑𝜑(∙) denotes the third-order polynomial included on the right-hand side of the selection equation as exclusion restriction. 
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TABLE 2: TFP growth elasticity of industrial clustering (OLS results) 
Dependent Variable ∆TFPipg (LP) ∆TFPipg (W) ∆TFPipg (ACF) 
Distribution of Organized Crime (OCp2010)    
1st Percentile 0.068**** 0.067**** 0.044**** (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) 
25th Percentile 0.049**** 0.048**** 0.031*** (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
50th Percentile 0.044**** 0.043**** 0.028*** (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
75th Percentile 0.042**** 0.041**** 0.026*** (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
99th Percentile 0.021** 0.019 0.011 (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
Notes: The estimated elasticities of the industrial clustering variable ( 𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2010 ) refer to 
specifications (2) in Table 1. 
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TABLE 3: TSLS results 
Dependent variable ∆TFPipg (LP) ∆TFPipg (W) ∆TFPipg (ACF) 
Specification (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) TFPipg2010  -0.399**** -0.394**** -0.402**** -0.398**** -0.418**** -0.417**** 
 (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.018) (0.018) AGEipg2010  -0.047**** -0.047**** -0.046**** -0.046**** -0.031**** -0.032**** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) SIZE_CLASSipg2010  -0.057*** -0.058*** -0.061*** -0.063*** -0.039** -0.040** 
 (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.018) (0.018) ICpg2010  0.133**** -0.173 0.130**** -0.172 0.062** -0.121 
 (0.036) (0.126) (0.036) (0.125) (0.026) (0.075) OCp2010  -0.093*** -0.095*** -0.091*** -0.094*** -0.039* -0.055*** 
 (0.033) (0.031) (0.032) (0.031) (0.023) (0.021) ICpg2010 × OCp2010  … -0.068** … -0.068** … -0.045** 
  (0.029)  (0.029)  (0.018) 
𝜆𝜆  -0.719**** -0.711**** -0.703**** -0.698**** -0.285**** -0.284**** 
 (0.073) (0.074) (0.072) (0.072) (0.057) (0.057) Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
NUTS-1 Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of Firms 17,961 17,961 17,961 17,961 17,961 17,961 
Model F statistic [p-value] 19.82 [0.000] 17.93 [0.000] 20.14 [0.000] 18.26 [0.000] 23.52 [0.000] 22.64 [0.000] 
Mean VIF 3.05 3.67 3.05 3.67 3.02 3.64 
First-stage F statistic [p-value]       ICpg2010  105.81 [0.000] 101.25 [0.000] 105.86 [0.000] 101.29 [0.000] 106.28 [0.000] 101.54 [0.000] OCp2010  127.71 [0.000] 110.56 [0.000] 127.78 [0.000] 110.58 [0.000] 128.28 [0.000] 110.71 [0.000] ICpg2010 × OCp2010  … 146.32 [0.000] … 146.32 [0.000] … 146.47 [0.000] 
Elasticity of ICpg2010 0.133**** 0.080** 0.130**** 0.078** 0.062** 0.044** 
 (0.036) (0.034) (0.036) (0.034) (0.026) (0.020) Selection Equation       Number of Firms 26,812 26,812 26,812 26,812 26,812 26,812 
Pseudo R2 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 
Model Wald 𝜒𝜒2 [p-value] 1,852.28 [0.000] 1,844.58 [0.000] 1,846.65 [0.000] 1,838.79 [0.000] 1,854.11 [0.000] 1,850.27 [0.000] 
H0: 𝜑𝜑(∙) = 0 218.39 [0.000] 215.23 [0.000] 223.46 [0.000] 220.29 [0.000] 280.18 [0.000] 277.20 [0.000] 
Notes: *𝑝𝑝 < 0.1; **𝑝𝑝 < 0.05; ***𝑝𝑝 < 0.01; ****𝑝𝑝 < 0.001. Bootstrapped (1,000 replications) standard errors are shown in parentheses, and they are clustered 
at the province-industry level. All specifications include a constant term. LP denotes Levinsohn and Petrin's (2003) approach, W denotes Wooldridge's (2009) 
approach, while ACF denotes Ackerberg et al.'s (2015) approach to firms' TFP estimation. 𝜆𝜆 denotes the inverse Mills ratio from the first-stage selection 
equations. 𝜑𝜑(∙) denotes the third-order polynomial included on the right-hand side of the selection equation as exclusion restriction. 
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TABLE 4: TFP growth elasticity of industrial clustering (TSLS results) 
Dependent Variable ∆TFPipg (LP) ∆TFPipg (W) ∆TFPipg (ACF) 
Distribution of Organized Crime (OCp2010)    
1st Percentile 0.304**** 0.301**** 0.192**** (0.088) (0.087) (0.059) 
25th Percentile 0.129**** 0.128**** 0.077**** (0.032) (0.032) (0.022) 
50th Percentile 0.086*** 0.085*** 0.049** (0.033) (0.033) (0.020) 
75th Percentile 0.063* 0.062* 0.034 (0.038) (0.037) (0.022) 
99th Percentile -0.134 -0.124 -0.096 (0.110) (0.109) (0.065) 
Notes: The estimated elasticities of the industrial clustering variable ( 𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2010 ) refer to 
specifications (2) in Table 3. 
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TABLE 5: TSLS results by size class 
Dependent variable ∆TFPipg (LP) ∆TFPipg (W) ∆TFPipg (ACF) 
Specification (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) TFPipg2010  -0.395**** -0.391**** -0.397**** -0.394**** -0.416**** -0.416**** 
 (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.018) (0.018) AGEipg2010  -0.044**** -0.046**** -0.043**** -0.046**** -0.030**** -0.032**** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) SIZE_CLASSipg2010  0.033 0.038 0.026 0.026 -0.054 -0.013 
 (0.073) (0.089) (0.073) (0.088) (0.057) (0.072) ICpg2010  0.183**** -0.321 0.179**** -0.321 0.082** -0.238* 
 (0.045) (0.206) (0.045) (0.204) (0.034) (0.132) OCp2010  -0.109*** -0.138*** -0.106*** -0.135*** -0.038 -0.078** 
 (0.040) (0.046) (0.040) (0.045) (0.030) (0.034) ICpg2010 × OCp2010  ... -0.119** ... -0.118** ... -0.082** 
  (0.051)  (0.050)  (0.034) ICpg2010 × SIZE_CLASSipg2010  -0.132**** 0.255* -0.130**** 0.258* -0.053** 0.203* 
 (0.031) (0.155) (0.031) (0.154) (0.025) (0.109) OCp2010 × SIZE_CLASSipg2010  0.058** 0.062** 0.057** 0.059* 0.009 0.028 
 (0.027) (0.031) (0.027) (0.031) (0.021) (0.025) ICpg2010 × OCp2010 × SIZE_CLASSipg2010  ... 0.086** ... 0.086** ... 0.062** 
  (0.040)  (0.040)  (0.029) 
𝜆𝜆  -0.667**** -0.684**** -0.650**** -0.669**** -0.262**** -0.274**** 
 (0.070) (0.074) (0.069) (0.073) (0.055) (0.057) Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
NUTS-1 Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of Firms 17,961 17,961 17,961 17,961 17,961 17,961 
Model F statistic [p-value] 18.39 [0.000] 16.11 [0.000] 18.64 [0.000] 16.36 [0.000] 22.04 [0.000] 20.69 [0.000] 
Mean VIF 5.02 8.32 5.01 8.31 4.90 8.18 
First-stage F statistic [p-value]       ICpg2010  54.43 [0.000] 51.41 [0.000] 54.43 [0.000] 51.44 [0.000] 54.31 [0.000] 51.57 [0.000] OCp2010  65.34 [0.000] 55.42 [0.000] 65.36 [0.000] 55.44 [0.000] 65.52 [0.000] 55.50 [0.000] ICpg2010 × OCp2010  ... 74.05 [0.000] ... 74.06 [0.000] ... 74.12 [0.000] ICpg2010 × SIZE_CLASSipg2010  54.37 [0.000] 105.32 [0.000] 54.28 [0.000] 105.35 [0.000] 54.43 [0.000] 105.38 [0.000] OCp2010 × SIZE_CLASSipg2010  80.74 [0.000] 82.09 [0.000] 80.87 [0.000] 82.18 [0.000] 80.64 [0.000] 82.06 [0.000] ICpg2010 × OCp2010 × SIZE_CLASSipg2010  ... 70.01 [0.000] ... 70.01 [0.000] ... 69.96 [0.000] 
Selection Equation       
Number of Firms 26,812 26,812 26,812 26,812 26,812 26,812 
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Pseudo R2 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 
Model Wald 𝜒𝜒2 [p-value] 1,994.55 [0.000] 1,866.84 [0.000] 1,987.33 [0.000] 1,860.54 [0.000] 1,989.05 [0.000] 1,875 [0.000] 
H0: 𝜑𝜑(∙) = 0 217.68 [0.000] 214.44 [0.000] 222.61 [0.000] 219.63 [0.000] 279.81 [0.000] 275.86 [0.000] 
Notes: *𝑝𝑝 < 0.1; **𝑝𝑝 < 0.05; ***𝑝𝑝 < 0.01; ****𝑝𝑝 < 0.001. Bootstrapped (1,000 replications) standard errors are shown in parentheses, and they are clustered at the 
province-industry level. All specifications include a constant term. LP denotes Levinsohn and Petrin's (2003) approach, W denotes Wooldridge's (2009) approach, 
while ACF denotes Ackerberg et al.'s (2015) approach to firms' TFP estimation. 𝜆𝜆 denotes the inverse Mills ratio from the first-stage selection equations. 𝜑𝜑(∙) denotes 
the third-order polynomial included on the right-hand side of the selection equation as exclusion restriction. 
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TABLE 6: TFP growth elasticity of industrial clustering and organized crime by size class (TSLS, 
two-way interactions) 
Dependent Variable ∆TFPipg (LP) ∆TFPipg (W) ∆TFPipg (ACF) 
Size Class Small Large Small Large Small Large ICpg2010  0.183**** 0.051* 0.179**** 0.049* 0.055**** 0.039*** 
 (0.045) (0.026) (0.045) (0.026) (0.016) (0.014) OCp2010  -0.109*** -0.051** -0.106*** -0.049** -0.025** -0.027** 
 (0.040) (0.024) (0.040) (0.024) (0.012) (0.013) 
Notes: The estimated elasticities of the industrial clustering variable (𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2010) and the organized crime 
variable (𝑂𝑂𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖2010) refer to specifications (1) in Table 5. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
29 
TABLE 7: TFP growth elasticity of industrial clustering by size class (TSLS, three-way interaction) 
Dependent Variable ∆TFPipg (LP) ∆TFPipg (W) ∆TFPipg (ACF) 
Size Class Small Large Small Large Small Large 
Distribution of Organized Crime (OCp2010)       
1st Percentile 0.513**** 0.164*** 0.507**** 0.162*** 0.333*** 0.104** (0.159) (0.063) (0.157) (0.062) (0.113) (0.045) 
25th Percentile 0.207**** 0.080*** 0.203**** 0.079*** 0.123**** 0.053*** (0.048) (0.026) (0.048) (0.026) (0.036) (0.018) 
50th Percentile 0.132*** 0.059** 0.129*** 0.059** 0.072** 0.041*** (0.043) (0.025) (0.043) (0.024) (0.028) (0.030) 
75th Percentile 0.092* 0.048* 0.089* 0.048* 0.044 0.034** (0.050) (0.026) (0.039) (0.026) (0.030) (0.016) 
99th Percentile -0.253 -0.047 -0.253 -0.045 -0.192* -0.024 (0.178) (0.070) (0.176) (0.068) (0.113) (0.045) 
Notes: The estimated elasticities of the industrial clustering variable (𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2010) refer to specifications (2) in Table 5. 
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APPENDIX 
TABLE A1: Sample distribution by industry and two-digit sector 
Industry Ateco 2007 Two-Digit Sector Number of Firms a. v. % 
1 10 - Food products 2,215 8.26 
1 11 - Beverages 392 1.46 
1 12 - Tobacco products 0 0.00 
2 13 - Textiles 1,140 4.25 
2 14 - Wearing apparel 1,008 3.76 
2 15 - Leather and related products 961 3.58 
3 16 - Wood, wood and cork products, except furniture; straw articles, plaiting materials 836 3.12 
4 17 - Paper and paper products 644 2.40 
5 18 - Printing and reproduction of recorded media 855 3.19 
6 19 - Coke and refined petroleum products 81 0.30 
7 20 - Chemicals and chemical products 1,009 3.76 
8 21 - Basic pharmaceutical products and pharmaceutical preparations 157 0.59 
9 22 - Rubber and plastic products 1,469 5.48 
10 23 - Other non-metallic mineral products 1,538 5.74 
11 24 - Basic metals 626 2.33 
12 25 - Fabricated metal products, except machinery and equipment 5,929 22.11 
13 26 - Computer, electronic, and optical products 935 3.49 
14 27 - Electrical equipment 1,228 4.58 
15 28 - Machinery and equipment N.E.C. 3,010 11.23 
16 29 - Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 400 1.49 
17 30 - Other transport equipment 298 1.11 
18 31 - Furniture 1,120 4.18 
18 32 - Other manufacturing 961 3.58 
19 33 - Repair and installation of machinery and equipment 0 0.00 
 Total Sample 26,812 100.00 
Notes: Firms are classified according to the Ateco 2007 classification of economic activities adopted by Istat, which 
corresponds to the NACE Rev. 2 classification. Industries are defined according to the input-output system adopted by 
Istat. 
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TABLE A2: Sample distribution by NUTS-1 geographic area 
NUTS-1 Geographic Area Number of Firms a. v. % 
North West 10,367 38.67 
North East 8,607 32.10 
Centre 4,447 16.59 
South 2,603 9.71 
Islands 788 2.94 
Total Sample 26,812 100.00 
Notes: North West includes Liguria, Lombardy, Piedmont and 
Aosta Valley; North East includes Emilia Romagna, Friuli-Venezia 
Giulia, Trentino-Alto Adige and Veneto; Centre includes Lazio, 
Marche, Tuscany and Umbria; South includes Abruzzi, Basilicata, 
Calabria, Campania, Molise and Apulia; Islands are Sicily and 
Sardinia. 
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TABLE A3: Descriptive statistics and correlation matrix of the variables entering the 
production function 
  Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. vaigpt kigpt ligpt migpt vaigpt  overall 6.136 1.422 -2.085 12.083 1    between  1.372 0.806 12.011 within  0.281 0.331 9.147 kigpt  overall 5.585 2.129 -7.028 12.660 0.693 1   between  2.091 -4.158 12.622 within  0.335 -0.780 11.108 ligpt  overall 5.718 1.395 -1.761 9.775 0.946 0.661 1  between  1.363 -0.181 9.680 within  0.202 1.677 8.303 migpt  overall 6.962 1.667 -2.188 14.293 0.848 0.655 0.807 1 between  1.628 0.017 13.978 within  0.225 2.785 10.458 
Notes: All variables are log-transformed. 𝑣𝑣𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 denotes value added; 𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 denotes the capital input; 𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  
denotes the labor input; 𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 denotes intermediate inputs. Descriptive statistics and the correlation matrix 
refer to a sample of 51,398 firms, i.e. 146,556 observations over the period 2009-2013. 
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TABLE A4: Estimated inputs' elasticities of the production functions 
Industry 
LP (2003) W (2009) ACF (2015) No. of 
Observations kigpt ligpt kigpt ligpt kigpt ligpt 
1 0.077**** 0.656**** 0.073**** 0.658**** 0.140**** 0.774**** 13,916 (0.012) (0.010) (0.012) (0.010) (0.008) (0.023) 
2 0.091**** 0.742**** 0.092**** 0.744**** 0.089**** 0.828**** 17,777 (0.007) (0.006) (0.008) (0.007) (0.005) (0.012) 
3 0.039** 0.695**** 0.041** 0.702**** 0.086**** 0.774**** 4,919 (0.017) (0.014) (0.016) (0.015) (0.008) (0.022) 
4 0.027 0.719**** 0.029 0.731**** 0.115**** 0.781**** 3,171 (0.033) (0.022) (0.033) (0.022) (0.019) (0.104) 
5 0.039** 0.728**** 0.040** 0.744**** 0.071**** 0.813**** 5,128 (0.018) (0.014) (0.016) (0.017) (0.008) (0.021) 
6 0.084 0.740**** 0.133 0.727**** 0.121 0.858**** 398 (0.153) (0.067) (0.166) (0.074) (0.094) (0.137) 
7 0.076**** 0.708**** 0.081**** 0.721**** 0.071**** 0.928**** 4,938 (0.018) (0.016) (0.018) (0.018) (0.009) (0.017) 
8 0.061 0.558**** 0.062 0.579**** 0.059* 0.806**** 798 (0.056) (0.042) (0.051) (0.047) (0.032) (0.180) 
9 0.069**** 0.692**** 0.069*** 0.702**** 0.110**** 0.829**** 7,638 (0.021) (0.011) (0.022) (0.013) (0.011) (0.020) 
10 0.087**** 0.671**** 0.086**** 0.683**** 0.096**** 0.810**** 8,845 (0.016) (0.012) (0.015) (0.013) (0.008) (0.016) 
11 0.026 0.739**** 0.048** 0.730**** 0.107**** 0.886**** 3,077 (0.034) (0.017) (0.024) (0.021) (0.016) (0.039) 
12 0.064**** 0.757**** 0.062**** 0.772**** 0.086**** 0.852**** 32,410 (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.003) (0.008) 
13 0.072**** 0.769**** 0.071**** 0.786**** 0.052**** 0.898**** 5,246 (0.013) (0.011) (0.013) (0.013) (0.005) (0.011) 
14 0.071**** 0.705**** 0.066**** 0.726**** 0.081**** 0.846**** 6,582 (0.012) (0.014) (0.011) (0.015) (0.011) (0.023) 
15 0.070**** 0.711**** 0.070**** 0.735**** 0.077**** 0.888**** 15,924 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.005) (0.010) 
16 0.051*** 0.771**** 0.051*** 0.795**** 0.068**** 0.906**** 2,149 (0.017) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.010) (0.019) 
17 0.019 0.756**** 0.029 0.763**** 0.050**** 0.886**** 1,928 (0.018) (0.019) (0.018) (0.021) (0.011) (0.019) 
18 0.059**** 0.693**** 0.059**** 0.710**** 0.093**** 0.770**** 11,712 (0.011) (0.010) (0.012) (0.011) (0.006) (0.019) 
Notes: * 𝑝𝑝 < 0.1; ** 𝑝𝑝 < 0.05; *** 𝑝𝑝 < 0.01; **** 𝑝𝑝 < 0.001. LP denotes Levinsohn and Petrin's (2003) approach, W 
denotes Wooldridge's (2009) approach, while ACF denotes Ackerberg et al.'s (2015) approach to firms' TFP estimation. 
𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 denotes the capital input, while 𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  denotes the labor input. TFP is estimated on a sample of 51,398 firms, i.e. 
146,556 observations over the period 2009-2013. Standard errors are shown in parentheses. 
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TABLE A5: Descriptive statistics of the dependent and main explanatory variables 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 No. Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
∆TFPipg (LP) 17,961 -0.047 0.411 -7.446 5.973 
∆TFPipg (W) 17,961 -0.048 0.411 -7.444 5.977 
∆TFPipg (ACF) 17,961 -0.057 0.410 -7.407 5.990 TFPipg2010 (LP) 26,812 1.748 0.523 -4.637 5.028 TFPipg2010 (W) 26,812 1.673 0.517 -4.752 4.955 TFPipg2010 (ACF) 26,812 0.887 0.423 -5.649 4.178 AGEipg2010  26,812 2.780 0.815 0.693 4.890 SIZE_CLASSipg2010  26,812 0.469 0.499 0.000 1.000 ICpg2010  26,812 -1.084 1.150 -4.745 2.467 OCp2010  26,812 -3.699 1.107 -6.992 -0.572 
Notes: LP denotes Levinsohn and Petrin's (2003) approach, W denotes Wooldridge's 
(2009) approach, while ACF denotes Ackerberg et al.'s (2015) approach to firms' 
TFP estimation. ∆ denotes the log difference between time 𝑇𝑇 and (𝑇𝑇 − 𝑡𝑡). 
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TABLE A6: Correlation matrix of the dependent variables 
  [1] [2] [3] 
∆TFPipg (LP) [1] 1   
∆TFPipg (W) [2] 0.9999 1  
∆TFPipg (ACF) [3] 0.9916 0.9928 1 
Notes: LP denotes Levinsohn and Petrin's (2003) approach, W denotes 
Wooldridge's (2009) approach, while ACF denotes Ackerberg et al.'s (2015) 
approach to firms' TFP estimation. 
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TABLE A7: Correlation matrix of the main explanatory variables 
  [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] TFPipg2010 (LP) [1] 1       TFPipg2010 (W) [2] 0.995 1      TFPipg2010 (ACF) [3] 0.759 0.779 1     AGEipg2010  [4] 0.181 0.173 -0.010 1    SIZE_CLASSipg2010  [5] 0.400 0.379 0.091 0.269 1   ICpg2010  [6] -0.014 0.016 0.048 0.065 -0.012 1  OCp2010  [7] -0.033 -0.038 -0.027 0.031 -0.035 0.661 1 
Notes: LP denotes Levinsohn and Petrin's (2003) approach, W denotes Wooldridge's (2009) 
approach, while ACF denotes Ackerberg et al.'s (2015) approach to firms' TFP estimation. 
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TABLE A8: Sample distribution by size 
Size Class Number of Firms a. v. % 
Small (≤ 14 employees) 14,234 53.09 
Large (> 14 employees) 12,578 46.91 
Total Sample 26,812 100.00 
Notes: The sample is split around the median value, which is 
defined on the 2010 employment distribution and is equal to 
14. 
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TABLE A9: OLS and TSLS results on labor productivity growth 
Dependent variable ∆Labor Productivityipg 
Estimation Method OLS TSLS 
Specification (1) (2) (1) (2) Labor Productivityipg2010  -0.455**** -0.455**** -0.463**** -0.454**** 
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.016) (0.016) AGEipg2010  -0.035**** -0.036**** -0.038**** -0.038**** 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) SIZE_CLASSipg2010  -0.103**** -0.104**** -0.107**** -0.103**** 
 (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) ICpg2010  0.061**** 0.034** 0.164**** -0.109 
 (0.010) (0.014) (0.034) (0.156) OCp2010  -0.033**** -0.037**** -0.108**** -0.112*** 
 (0.009) (0.010) (0.031) (0.037) ICpg2010 × OCp2010  … -0.007** … -0.061 
  (0.003)  (0.038) 
𝜆𝜆  -0.893**** -0.898**** -0.912**** -0.891**** 
 (0.083) (0.082) (0.084) (0.083) Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
NUTS-1 Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of Firms 17,961 17,961 17,961 17,961 
R2 0.17 0.17 ... ... 
Adjusted R2 0.17 0.17 ... ... 
Model F statistic [p-value] 48.50 [0.000] 47.83 [0.000] 49.45 [0.000] 46.99 [0.000] 
Mean VIF 3.94 4.55 3.01 3.64 
First-stage F statistic [p-value]     ICpg2010  ... ... 106.94 [0.000] 101.57 [0.000] OCp2010  ... ... 127.30 [0.000] 110.56 [0.000] ICpg2010 × OCp2010  ... ... … 146.02 [0.000] 
Elasticity of ICpg2010 0.061**** 0.061**** 0.164**** 0.118*** 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.034) (0.040) Selection Equation     Number of Firms 26,812 26,812 26,812 26,812 
Pseudo R2 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 
Model Wald 𝜒𝜒2 [p-value] 1,950.46 [0.000] 1,962.02 [0.000] 1,890.81 [0.000] 1,886.17 [0.000] 
H0: 𝜑𝜑(∙) = 0 196.11 [0.000] 196.47 [0.000] 198.56 [0.000] 195.07 [0.000] 
Notes: *𝑝𝑝 < 0.1; **𝑝𝑝 < 0.05; ***𝑝𝑝 < 0.01; ****𝑝𝑝 < 0.001. Bootstrapped (1,000 replications) standard errors are 
shown in parentheses, and they are clustered at the province-industry level. All specifications include a constant term. 𝜆𝜆 
denotes the inverse Mills ratio from the first-stage selection equations. 𝜑𝜑(∙) denotes the third-order polynomial included 
on the right-hand side of the selection equation as exclusion restriction. 
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TABLE A10: Labor productivity growth elasticity of industrial clustering 
Dependent Variable ∆Labor Productivityipg 
Estimation Method OLS TSLS 
Distribution of Organized Crime   
1st Percentile 0.086**** 0.320*** (0.014) (0.121) 
25th Percentile 0.068**** 0.162**** (0.010) (0.042) 
50th Percentile 0.062**** 0.124*** (0.010) (0.039) 
75th Percentile 0.060**** 0.103** (0.010) (0.043) 
99th Percentile 0.038*** -0.074 (0.013) (0.135) 
Notes: The estimated elasticities of the industrial clustering variable (𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2010 ) 
refer to specifications (2) in Table A9. 
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TABLE A11: TSLS results on 2013 productivity level 
Dependent variable TFPipg2013  (LP) TFPipg2013  (W) TFPipg2013  (ACF) Labor Productivityipg2013 
Specification (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) TFPipg2010  0.601**** 0.606**** 0.598**** 0.602**** 0.582**** 0.583**** ... ... 
 (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.018) (0.018)   Labor Productivityipg2010  ... ... ... ... ... ... 0.537**** 0.546**** 
       (0.016) (0.016) AGEipg2010  -0.047**** -0.047**** -0.046**** -0.046**** -0.031**** -0.032**** -0.038**** -0.038**** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.007) SIZE_CLASSipg2010  -0.057*** -0.058*** -0.061*** -0.063*** -0.039** -0.040** -0.107**** -0.103**** 
 (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.018) (0.018) (0.026) (0.026) ICpg2010  0.133**** -0.173 0.130**** -0.172 0.062** -0.121 0.164**** -0.109 
 (0.036) (0.126) (0.036) (0.125) (0.026) (0.075) (0.034) (0.156) OCp2010  -0.093*** -0.095*** -0.091*** -0.094*** -0.039* -0.055*** -0.108**** -0.112*** 
 (0.033) (0.031) (0.032) (0.031) (0.023) (0.021) (0.031) (0.037) ICpg2010 × OCp2010  … -0.068** … -0.068** … -0.045** … -0.061 
  (0.029)  (0.029)  (0.018)  (0.038) 
𝜆𝜆  -0.719**** -0.711**** -0.703**** -0.698**** -0.285**** -0.284**** -0.912**** -0.891**** 
 (0.073) (0.074) (0.072) (0.072) (0.057) (0.057) (0.084) (0.083) Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
NUTS-1 Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of Firms 17,961 17,961 17,961 17,961 17,961 17,961 17,961 17,961 
Model F statistic [p-value] 520.07 [0.000] 449.85 [0.000] 500.85 [0.000] 428.48 [0.000] 209.23 [0.000] 198.34 [0.000] 249.50 [0.000] 218.94 [0.000] 
Mean VIF 3.05 3.67 3.05 3.67 3.02 3.64 3.01 3.64 
First-stage F statistic [p-value]         ICpg2010  105.81 [0.000] 101.25 [0.000] 105.86 [0.000] 101.29 [0.000] 106.28 [0.000] 101.54 [0.000] 106.94 [0.000] 101.57 [0.000] OCp2010  127.71 [0.000] 110.56 [0.000] 127.78 [0.000] 110.58 [0.000] 128.28 [0.000] 110.71 [0.000] 127.30 [0.000] 110.56 [0.000] ICpg2010 × OCp2010  … 146.32 [0.000] … 146.32 [0.000] … 146.47 [0.000] … 146.02 [0.000] 
Elasticity of ICpg2010 0.133**** 0.080** 0.130**** 0.078** 0.062** 0.044** 0.164**** 0.118*** 
 (0.036) (0.034) (0.036) (0.034) (0.026) (0.020) (0.034) (0.040) Selection Equation         Number of Firms 26,812 26,812 26,812 26,812 26,812 26,812 26,812 26,812 
Pseudo R2 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 
Model Wald 𝜒𝜒2 [p-value] 1,852.28 [0.000] 1,844.58 [0.000] 1,846.65 [0.000] 1,838.79 [0.000] 1,854.11 [0.000] 1,850.27 [0.000] 1,890.81 [0.000] 1,886.17 [0.000] 
H0: 𝜑𝜑(∙) = 0 218.39 [0.000] 215.23 [0.000] 223.46 [0.000] 220.29 [0.000] 280.18 [0.000] 277.20 [0.000] 198.56 [0.000] 195.07 [0.000] 
Notes: *𝑝𝑝 < 0.1; **𝑝𝑝 < 0.05; ***𝑝𝑝 < 0.01; ****𝑝𝑝 < 0.001. Bootstrapped (1,000 replications) standard errors are shown in parentheses, and they are clustered at the province-industry level. All 
specifications include a constant term. LP denotes Levinsohn and Petrin's (2003) approach, W denotes Wooldridge's (2009) approach, while ACF denotes Ackerberg et al.'s (2015) approach to firms' TFP 
estimation. 𝜆𝜆 denotes the inverse Mills ratio from the first-stage selection equations. 𝜑𝜑(∙) denotes the third-order polynomial included on the right-hand side of the selection equation as exclusion restriction. 
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TABLE A12: 2013 productivity elasticity of industrial clustering (TSLS results) 
Dependent Variable TFPipg2013 (LP) TFPipg2013 (W) TFPipg2013 (ACF) Labor Productivityipg2013 
Distribution of Organized Crime (OCp2010)     
1st Percentile 0.304**** 0.301**** 0.192**** 0.320*** (0.088) (0.087) (0.059) (0.121) 
25th Percentile 0.129**** 0.127**** 0.077**** 0.162**** (0.033) (0.032) (0.022) (0.042) 
50th Percentile 0.086*** 0.085*** 0.049** 0.124*** (0.033) (0.033) (0.020) (0.039) 
75th Percentile 0.063* 0.062* 0.034 0.103** (0.038) (0.037) (0.022) (0.043) 
99th Percentile -0.134 -0.134 -0.096 -0.074 (0.110) (0.109) (0.065) (0.135) 
Notes: The estimated elasticities of the industrial clustering variable (𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2010) refer to specifications (2) in Table A11. 
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TABLE A13: TSLS results using a geographic concentration measure 
Dependent variable ∆TFPipg (LP) ∆TFPipg (W) ∆TFPipg (ACF) ∆Labor Productivityipg 
Specification (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) TFPipg2010  -0.400**** -0.398**** -0.403**** -0.401**** -0.418**** -0.418**** ... ... 
 (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.018) (0.018)   Labor Productivityipg2010  ... ... ... ... ... ... -0.463**** -0.458**** 
       (0.016) (0.015) AGEipg2010  -0.047**** -0.047**** -0.047**** -0.046**** -0.032**** -0.032**** -0.038**** -0.038**** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.007) SIZE_CLASSipg2010  -0.062*** -0.067*** -0.067*** -0.071**** -0.042** -0.045** -0.114**** -0.115**** 
 (0.020) (0.021) (0.020) (0.021) (0.018) (0.019) (0.027) (0.027) GCpg2010  0.107**** -0.091 0.105**** -0.091 0.050*** -0.067 0.132**** -0.036 
 (0.027) (0.072) (0.027) (0.071) (0.019) (0.041) (0.026) (0.094) OCp2010  -0.072*** -0.067*** -0.070*** -0.066*** -0.029* -0.038** -0.082**** -0.077*** 
 (0.025) (0.022) (0.025) (0.022) (0.017) (0.015) (0.024) (0.026) GCpg2010 × OCp2010  -0.039** ... -0.039** ... -0.026*** ... -0.033 ... 
 (0.016)  (0.016)  (0.010)  (0.022)  
𝜆𝜆  -0.737**** -0.744**** -0.721**** -0.728**** -0.293**** -0.300**** -0.933**** -0.928**** 
 (0.075) (0.075) (0.074) (0.074) (0.055) (0.058) (0.086) (0.086) Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
NUTS-1 Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of Firms 17,961 17,961 17,961 17,961 17,961 17,961 17,961 17,961 
Model F statistic [p-value] 19.36 [0.000] 18.29 [0.000] 19.71 [0.000] 18.61 [0.000] 23.36 [0.000] 22.69 [0.000] 48.82 [0.000] 48.49 [0.000] 
Mean VIF 3.05 3.77 3.05 3.77 3.02 3.73 3.01 3.73 
First-stage F statistic [p-value]         GCpg2010  109.73 [0.000] 128.90 [0.000] 109.80 [0.000] 128.93 [0.000] 110.16 [0.000] 129.05 [0.000] 110.47 [0.000] 128.92 [0.000] OCp2010  127.71 [0.000] 110.56 [0.000] 127.78 [0.000] 110.58 [0.000] 128.28 [0.000] 110.71 [0.000] 127.30 [0.000] 110.56 [0.000] GCpg2010 × OCp2010  … 136.66 [0.000] … 136.67 [0.000] … 136.73 [0.000] … 136.70 [0.000] 
Elasticity of GCpg2010 0.107**** 0.055** 0.105**** 0.054** 0.050*** 0.030** 0.132**** 0.086**** 
 (0.027) (0.022) (0.027) (0.021) (0.019) (0.013) (0.026) (0.026) Selection Equation         Number of Firms 26,812 26,812 26,812 26,812 26,812 26,812 26,812 26,812 
Pseudo R2 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 
Model Wald 𝜒𝜒2 [p-value] 1,852.28 [0.000] 1,844.58 [0.000] 1,846.65 [0.000] 1,838.79 [0.000] 1,854.11 [0.000] 1,850.27 [0.000] 1,890.81 [0.000] 1,886.17 [0.000] 
H0: 𝜑𝜑(∙) = 0 218.39 [0.000] 215.23 [0.000] 223.46 [0.000] 220.29 [0.000] 280.18 [0.000] 277.20 [0.000] 198.56 [0.000] 195.07 [0.000] 
Notes: *𝑝𝑝 < 0.1; **𝑝𝑝 < 0.05; ***𝑝𝑝 < 0.01; ****𝑝𝑝 < 0.001. Bootstrapped (1,000 replications) standard errors are shown in parentheses, and they are clustered at the province-industry level. All 
specifications include a constant term. LP denotes Levinsohn and Petrin's (2003) approach, W denotes Wooldridge's (2009) approach, while ACF denotes Ackerberg et al.'s (2015) approach to firms' TFP 
estimation. 𝜆𝜆 denotes the inverse Mills ratio from the first-stage selection equations. 𝜑𝜑(∙) denotes the third-order polynomial included on the right-hand side of the selection equation as exclusion restriction. 
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TABLE A14: Growth elasticity of geographic concentration (TSLS results) 
Dependent Variable ∆TFPipg (LP) ∆TFPipg (W) ∆TFPipg (ACF) ∆Labor Productivityipg 
Distribution of Organized Crime (OCp2010)     
1st Percentile 0.185**** 0.182**** 0.116**** 0.195*** (0.046) (0.045) (0.031) (0.068) 
25th Percentile 0.084**** 0.082**** 0.049**** 0.110**** (0.019) (0.019) (0.013) (0.025) 
50th Percentile 0.059*** 0.057*** 0.032*** 0.089**** (0.021) (0.057) (0.012) (0.025) 
75th Percentile 0.045* 0.044* 0.023* 0.078** (0.024) (0.023) (0.013) (0.028) 
99th Percentile -0.069 -0.069 -0.052 -0.017 (0.063) (0.062) (0.036) (0.082) 
Notes: The estimated elasticities of the geographic concentration variable (𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2010) refer to specifications (2) in Table A13. 
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TABLE A15: TSLS results using an extended organized crime variables 
Dependent variable ∆TFPipg (LP) ∆TFPipg (W) ∆TFPipg (ACF) ∆Labor Productivityipg 
Specification (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) TFPipg2010  -0.399**** -0.393**** -0.402**** -0.397**** -0.418**** -0.417**** … … 
 (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.018) (0.018)   Labor Productivityipg2010  … … … … … … -0.464**** -0.453**** 
       (0.016) (0.016) AGEipg2010  -0.047**** -0.047**** -0.047**** -0.047**** -0.032**** -0.032**** -0.038**** -0.038**** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.007) SIZE_CLASSipg2010  -0.057*** -0.059*** -0.062*** -0.063*** -0.039** -0.040** -0.108**** -0.104**** 
 (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.017) (0.018) (0.026) (0.026) ICpg2010  0.137**** -0.193 0.134**** -0.192 0.064** -0.133* 0.169**** -0.130 
 (0.040) (0.133) (0.039) (0.132) (0.026) (0.079) (0.038) (0.163) OCp2010  -0.098*** -0.096*** -0.095*** -0.094*** -0.041* -0.055** -0.114*** -0.113*** 
 (0.037) (0.034) (0.036) (0.033) (0.023) (0.022) (0.035) (0.039) ICpg2010 × OCp2010  ... -0.076** ... -0.076** ... -0.050** ... -0.069* 
  (0.032)  (0.032)  (0.020)  (0.041) 
𝜆𝜆  -0.722**** -0.713**** -0.707**** -0.699**** -0.286**** -0.285**** -0.917**** -0.892**** 
 (0.074) (0.074) (0.072) (0.073) (0.054) (0.057) (0.084) (0.083) Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
NUTS-1 Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of Firms 17,961 17,961 17,961 17,961 17,961 17,961 17,961 17,961 
Model F statistic [p-value] 19.77 [0.000] 17.80 [0.000] 20.09 [0.000] 18.14 [0.000] 23.35 [0.000] 22.60 [0.000] 49.46 [0.000] 46.85 [0.000] 
Mean VIF 3.08 3.69 2.08 3.69 3.05 3.66 3.04 3.65 
First-stage F statistic [p-value]         ICpg2010  105.81 [0.000] 101.25 [0.000] 105.86 [0.000] 101.29 [0.000] 106.26 [0.000] 101.54 [0.000] 106.94 [0.000] 101.57 [0.000] OCp2010  129.30 [0.000] 108.61 [0.000] 129.37 [0.000] 108.63 [0.000] 129.84 [0.000] 108.76 [0.000] 129.27 [0.000] 108.67 [0.000] ICpg2010 × OCp2010  … 149.07 [0.000] … 149.63 [0.000] … 149.22 [0.000] … 148.79 [0.000] 
Elasticity of ICpg2010 0.137**** 0.075** 0.134**** 0.074** 0.064** 0.041* 0.169**** 0.114*** 
 (0.040) (0.036) (0.039) (0.036) (0.026) (0.021) (0.038) (0.042) Selection Equation         Number of Firms 26,812 26,812 26,812 26,812 26,812 26,812 26,812 26,812 
Pseudo R2 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 
Model Wald 𝜒𝜒2 [p-value] 1,852.28 [0.000] 1,844.58 [0.000] 1,846.65 [0.000] 1,838.79 [0.000] 1,854.11 [0.000] 1,850.27 [0.000] 1,890.81 [0.000] 1,886.17 [0.000] 
H0: 𝜑𝜑(∙) = 0 218.39 [0.000] 215.23 [0.000] 223.46 [0.000] 220.29 [0.000] 280.18 [0.000] 277.20 [0.000] 198.56 [0.000] 195.07 [0.000] 
Notes: *𝑝𝑝 < 0.1; **𝑝𝑝 < 0.05; ***𝑝𝑝 < 0.01; ****𝑝𝑝 < 0.001. Bootstrapped (1,000 replications) standard errors are shown in parentheses, and they are clustered at the province-industry level. All 
specifications include a constant term. LP denotes Levinsohn and Petrin's (2003) approach, W denotes Wooldridge's (2009) approach, while ACF denotes Ackerberg et al.'s (2015) approach to firms' TFP 
estimation. 𝜆𝜆 denotes the inverse Mills ratio from the first-stage selection equations. 𝜑𝜑(∙) denotes the third-order polynomial included on the right-hand side of the selection equation as exclusion restriction. 
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TABLE A16: Growth elasticity of industrial clustering (TSLS results) 
Dependent Variable ∆TFPipg (LP) ∆TFPipg (W) ∆TFPipg (ACF) ∆Labor Productivityipg 
Distribution of Organized Crime (OCp2010)     
1st Percentile 0.341**** 0.337**** 0.215*** 0.356*** (0.103) (0.102) (0.069) (0.137) 
25th Percentile 0.146**** 0.143**** 0.087**** 0.178**** (0.036) (0.036) (0.025) (0.047) 
50th Percentile 0.098*** 0.096*** 0.056*** 0.134**** (0.033) (0.033) (0.021) (0.039) 
75th Percentile 0.072* 0.070* 0.039* 0.110*** (0.037) (0.037) (0.022) (0.042) 
99th Percentile -0.149 -0.148 -0.105 -0.090 (0.115) (0.114) (0.068) (0.140) 
Notes: The estimated elasticities of the industrial clustering variable (𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2010) refer to specifications (2) in Table A15. 
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TABLE A17: TSLS results without correcting for sample selection 
Dependent variable ∆TFPipg (LP) ∆TFPipg (W) ∆TFPipg (ACF) 
Specification (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) TFPipg2010  -0.282**** -0.319**** -0.290**** -0.327**** -0.386**** -0.399**** 
 (0.015) (0.017) (0.016) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) AGEipg2010  0.009* -0.009** 0.009** -0.009** -0.004 -0.016**** 
 (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) SIZE_CLASSipg2010  0.117**** 0.133**** 0.113**** 0.127**** 0.044**** 0.046**** 
 (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.006) (0.006) ICpg2010  0.082*** -0.078 0.082**** -0.079 0.057*** -0.083* 
 (0.026) (0.048) (0.020) (0.048) (0.018) (0.046) OCp2010  -0.094**** -0.039** -0.094**** -0.038** -0.059**** -0.033** 
 (0.021) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.015) (0.016) ICpg2010 × OCp2010  ... -0.029** ... -0.029** ... -0.029** 
  (0.013)  (0.013)  (0.012) Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
NUTS-1 Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of Firms 17,961 17,961 17,961 17,961 17,961 17,961 
Model F statistic [p-value] 41.89 [0.000] 17.64 [0.000] 27.58 [0.000] 17.95 [0.000] 39.92 [0.000] 23.36 [0.000] 
Mean VIF 3.12 3.76 3.12 3.76 3.09 3.73 
First-stage F statistic [p-value]       ICpg2010  110.07 [0.000] 104.37 [0.000] 110.07 [0.000] 104.37 [0.000] 109.98 [0.000] 104.30 [0.000] OCp2010  133.27 [0.000] 112.51 [0.000] 133.28 [0.000] 112.52 [0.000] 133.27 [0.000] 112.51 [0.000] ICpg2010 × OCp2010  ... 148.30 [0.000] ... 148.30 [0.000] ... 148.31 [0.000] 
Elasticity of ICpg2010 0.082*** 0.031** 0.082**** 0.030** 0.057*** 0.026** 
 (0.026) (0.013) (0.020) (0.013) (0.018) (0.013) 
Notes: *𝑝𝑝 < 0.1; **𝑝𝑝 < 0.05; ***𝑝𝑝 < 0.01; ****𝑝𝑝 < 0.001. Bootstrapped (1,000 replications) standard errors are shown in parentheses, and they are clustered at 
the province-industry level. All specifications include a constant term. LP denotes Levinsohn and Petrin's (2003) approach, W denotes Wooldridge's (2009) 
approach, while ACF denotes Ackerberg et al.'s (2015) approach to firms' TFP estimation. 
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TABLE A18: Growth elasticity of industrial clustering without correcting for sample selection (TSLS results) 
Dependent Variable ∆TFPipg (LP) ∆TFPipg (W) ∆TFPipg (ACF) 
Distribution of Organized Crime (OCp2010)    
1st Percentile 0.127*** 0.127*** 0.122*** (0.047) (0.047) (0.044) 
25th Percentile 0.052*** 0.051*** 0.047*** (0.018) (0.018) (0.017) 
50th Percentile 0.033** 0.033** 0.028** (0.014) (0.014) (0.013) 
75th Percentile 0.023* 0.023* 0.018 (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) 
99th Percentile -0.061 -0.062 -0.066* (0.041) (0.041) (0.039) 
Notes: The estimated elasticities of the industrial clustering variable (𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2010) refer to specifications (2) in Table A17. 
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TABLE A19: TSLS results controlling for endogenous exit in TFP estimation 
Dependent Variables ∆TFPipg (LP - endogenous exit) 
Specification (1) (2) TFPipg2010  -0.399**** -0.394**** 
 (0.020) (0.020) AGEipg2010  -0.046**** -0.046**** 
 (0.006) (0.006) SIZE_CLASSipg2010  -0.053*** -0.055*** 
 (0.020) (0.020) ICpg2010  0.130**** -0.171 
 (0.036) (0.124) OCp2010  -0.090*** -0.093*** 
 (0.032) (0.030) ICpg2010 × OCp2010  ... -0.067** 
  (0.029) 
𝜆𝜆  -0.701**** -0.694**** 
 (0.073) (0.073) Industry Dummies Yes Yes 
NUTS-1 Dummies Yes Yes 
Number of Firms 17961 17961 
Model F statistic [p-value] 19.93 [0.000] 18.04 [0.000] 
Mean VIF 3.05 3.67 
First-stage F statistic [p-value]   ICpg2010  105.80 [0.000] 101.24 [0.000] OCp2010  127.69 [0.000] 110.56 [0.000] ICpg2010 × OCp2010  ... 146.32 [0.000] 
Elasticity of ICpg2010 0.130**** 0.078** 
 (0.036) (0.034) Selection Equation   Number of Firms 26,812 26,812 
Pseudo R2 0.06 0.06 
Model Wald 𝜒𝜒2 [p-value] 1,854.49 [0.000] 1,846.84 [0.000] 
H0: 𝜑𝜑(∙) = 0 220.35 [0.000] 217.16 [0.000] 
Notes: *𝑝𝑝 < 0.1 ; **𝑝𝑝 < 0.05 ; ***𝑝𝑝 < 0.01 ; ****𝑝𝑝 < 0.001 . Bootstrapped 
(1,000 replications) standard errors are shown in parentheses, and they are 
clustered at the province-industry level. All specifications include a constant term. 
LP denotes Levinsohn and Petrin's (2003) approach, which is modified to account 
for endogenous exit following Olley and Pakes' (1996) approach. 𝜆𝜆 denotes the 
inverse Mills ratio from the first-stage selection equations. 𝜑𝜑(∙) denotes the third-
order polynomial included on the right-hand side of the selection equation as 
exclusion restriction. 
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TABLE A20: Growth elasticity of industrial clustering controlling for endogenous exit in 
TFP estimation (TSLS results) 
Dependent Variable ∆TFPipg (LP - endogenous exit) 
Distribution of Organized Crime (OCp2010)  
1st Percentile 0.300**** (0.086) 
25th Percentile 0.127**** (0.032) 
50th Percentile 0.085*** (0.033) 
75th Percentile 0.062* (0.037) 
99th Percentile -0.133 (0.108) 
Notes: The estimated elasticities of the industrial clustering variable (𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2010 ) 
refer to specification (2) in Table A19. 
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FIGURE A1: Spatial distribution of the organized crime variable 
 
Notes: Quartile distribution of the organized crime variable (e�𝑂𝑂𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖2010�). 
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FIGURE A2: Distribution of firm-level employment in 2010 
 
 
Notes: The solid line refers to the normal curve. The 2010 employment variable ranges in the interval [1, 249], 
and it presents mean value equal to 28.02 and standard deviation equal to 36.98. The null hypothesis of 
normality is rejected with p-value equal to 0.000. 
 
 
